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THE USE OF SURVEY EVIDENCE IN ANTITRUST
PROCEEDINGS
WILLIAM N. EARLY*
The most difficult problem facing the antitrust practitioner is that
of securing evidence to support his theory of the case. Although such
a problem is a prime consideration in any field of law, it is peculiarly
so in antitrust work because of the intangibility of the evidence
required. The trend toward industrial concentration, brought on by
a depression, two wars, and continued emergency conditions, has seen
the work loads of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department
and the Antimonopoly Division of the Federal Trade Commission
increase tremendously.- As a corollary to this, there has been a cor-
responding increase in the work of firms specializing in antitrust work.
The burden connected with prosecuting or defending an antitrust
action is enormous.2 Besides the obvious difficulties of a prolonged
legal action, there is the financial burden of large staffs of secretaries,
economists, detectives, investigators, and batteries of attorneys, who
are necessary simply to keep abreast of the complex and voluminous
evidence. "Competition" is a phenomenon that has never been defined
precisely and which is constantly changing. Injury to it must be
inferred from surrounding circumstances rather than by direct testi-
mony.3 Consideration of these "surrounding circumstances" involves
a search into market conditions, sources of supply, and the whole
complex of economic facts involved in "doing business." These them-
selves would be difficult enough, but proving the probable effects of a
merger is even more difficult since it looks to the future rather than
to past or present facts. The enforcement agencies have been quick
* Former trial attorney, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. The views
expressed are those of the author and not of any other person or agency.1 FTC, REPORT ON COaPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuIsiTIoNs (1955).
2 In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349, 110 F.Supp. 295
(D.Mass. 1950, 1952), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), the hearing took 121 days, covered
14,194 pages of transcript and there were 5,512 exhibits of some 26,477 pages. McAl-
lister, The Big Case: Procedural Problemns in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARv. L. REv.
27 (1950). The suit may take so long that it after appeals have been made and final
judgment entered, the original issue may have become moot, and the court is faced
with a meaningless decree and has no power to cope with any new violations occurring
subsequent to the filing of the complaint. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
3 In the matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555, 1110 (1953). The decision
would require an analysis of the pertinent market as well as consideration of the
merger at issue. At last examination there were some 25,000 pages of transcript in
this case spread over a 3-year period.
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to recognize the need for greater flexibility in procedure to "permit
reception of evidence not based wholly on absolute facts such as precise
sales, costs or profits."4 However, even this vague definition must be
read in terms of the particular case.'
The desirability of reducing such evidence to some more palatable
form is felt by both bench and bar. The mountains of testimony and
exhibits introduced in an antitrust case often make actual decision
almost haphazard for the trier of fact. Research and compilation of
this mass expends the time and energy of large groups of people. Even
the preliminary investigation of a case often requires the interviewing
of several hundred witnesses. Once a "file" is completed and the deci-
sion to prosecute given, the introduction of this evidence becomes a
problem. Where there is such a great mass, it is difficult to emphasize
the more important features of the case. The result has been that anti-
trust cases become interminable, and effective law enforcement is
hampered. Respondents are forced into prolonged and costly litigation.
Many procedural shortcuts have been proposed. However, the enforce-
ment agencies have discovered an evidentiary shortcut about which
the average antitrust practitioner knows little or nothing. It is with
this evidentiary shortcut-survey evidence-that this article deals.
By definition, a survey is a "critical examination or inspection, often
of an official character, for an implied or specified purpose." I As the
term will be used herein, a survey is a summary or tabulation of other
evidence by means of which facts stated in the latter are sought to
be proved.
The use of surveys has had a checkered history in the courts. In
certain fields surveys have long been accepted; in others, only recently
have surveys been admitted. The use of surveys in antitrust proceed-
ings is relatively new, and the theories advanced to support their
reception into evidence have been forced to rely on older, and often
strange, rationales. Several decisions have brought to the fore the
admissibility of survey evidence in antitrust proceedings. In these
"Hearing officers and judges should permit industry and company history, industry
and company statistics, pricing and trade practices, price levels and variations in price,
and other business facts to be shown by methods usually employed by practical mar-
keting men.... Summaries, tabulations, charts, graphs, sampling and polls of public
opinion should be admitted into evidence if antitrust enforcement is to succeed as a
practical matter." Speech by former FTC Chairman Edward Howry, "Coalescence
of Legal and Economic Concepts of Competition" (January, 1955).
" See Barnes, Economic Issues in the Regulation of Acquisitions and Mergers, 14
OHIo ST. L. Rnv. 279 (1953); In the matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Dkt. No. 6000
(FTC, December 28, 1953).
" WESTR's IxTERNATIOAL Dicio0ARY (2d ed. 1941).
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cases market position was sought to be shown by use of surveys of
sources of supply and buyers. One recent case has dealt with the ad-
missibility of a survey especially conceived and conducted for the
purposes of trial.7
Because of the increased reliance put upon surveys by enforcement
agencies, the practitioner in the field of antitrust must be prepared to
meet, and attack if possible, this type of evidence, and to utilize it to
his own advantage; and the bench must come to recognize the utility
of this approach to evidence. This article will consider the usual
objections which are made to the use and admissibility and suggest
some safeguards against the introduction of slanted or improperly
conducted surveys.
GROUNDS FOR INADMISSIBILITY
Hearsay. A primary objection to the introduction of survey evi-
dence is that it is hearsay.' This objection is well-founded, at least in
theory, for the survey tabulation may be hearsay based upon the hear-
say of the reports making it up. If these reports were certified copies
of business records, then perhaps the Federal Business Entry Statute9
might apply to them. But where the reports are merely uncertified
answers to questionnaires prepared for the purpose of trial, this
exception to the hearsay rule would not pertain. Merely to classify
it as hearsay is not to say that evidence has no probative value. Its
unreliability is not necessarily proved because it fits into one of the
categories of the hearsay rule.1"
There have grown up a number of so-called exceptions to the hear-
say rule. It is generally felt that these exceptions derive either from
a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness and/or a necessity for
the evidence in question.1 Where proof of market conditions is at
issue, the obvious difficulties of parading several hundred witnesses
7 In the matter of Crown Zellerbach Corp., 51 F.T.C. 1105 (1955).
8 "Testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such
statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein,
and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."
McCoRMicK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954).
9 49 STAT. 1561, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1952). See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109 (1943). Of course, the records would have been made in the regular course
of business.
10 American Rubber Products Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1954). "So,
of the fact that it was hearsay, it suffices to observe that when evidence of that char-
acter is admitted without objection, it is to be considered and given its natural proba-
tive effect as if it were in law admissible." Id. at 52.
115 Wumxo0m, EVIDENCE § 1420 (3d ed. 1940). The author noted that "Each excep-
tion, to be sure, has come into existence and been maintained independently and amid
considerations peculiar to itself alone."
[WImnR
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before the tribunal would seem to be sufficient necessity for the intro-
duction of a well-prepared survey. Several cases have recognized this
principle.
In re Fennerstein's Champagne12 asserted by way of dictum that
the market value of articles of merchandise at a particular place in a
foreign country may be shown by way of letters from third parties to
other strangers written in the ordinary course of business. Proof that
a party had lent money to a bank was established by the testimony of
a third person from his examination of the bank's books. The Supreme
Court stated, "When it is necessary to prove the results of voluminous
facts or of the examination of many books and papers, and the exami-
nation cannot be conveniently made in court, the results may be
proven by the person who made the examination."' 3 In the Alcoa case"4
witnesses testified over objection as to the existence of bauxite deposits
in Arkansas. Their testimony was based on numerous (605) test-
boring reports made by many drillers. The drillers and the records
were not produced in court. In admitting this evidence the court
treated many of the problems raised by surveys. It analysed the
problems according to the requirements suggested above. The court
felt that opinion testimony based wholly or partially upon information
either oral or documentary, gathered from some other person which
is trustworthy and practically unobtainable otherwise, is admissible
even though the first-hand sources are not produced in court. Here,
however, there was expert testimony based upon the expert reports
of others as to the existence of concrete facts. Apparently the science
of geology has more common agreement upon principles than does
that of economics. What may be clear to a geologist after examining
sampling data might in an analogous situation be a point of contention
between economists. This would go to the theories upon which the
sampling was taken and to the accuracy of the sampling rather than
to the over-all question of admissibility.
The second reason for breaching the hearsay rule was that there
was a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. Statisticians have
been quick to defend the accuracy of their brain-children. One
authority in this field has said that a statistical survey "produces man's
best empirical knowledge .... The precision desired can be aimed at
and hit pretty accurately by planning in advance with the aid of the
12 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 145 (1866).
13 Burton v. Driggs, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 125, 136 (1873).
1 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 35 F.Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
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theory of probability and with bits of knowledge with respect to cer-
tain proportions, means, correlations, variances, and other statistical
measures of the sampling units in the frame." " The very nature of
polling techniques makes it unlikely that the interviewed person would
have any reason or motive to lie. Methods have been devised by
psychologists to prevent vagaries which have been described as a
form of "amateur cross-examination."'
An independent survey conducted by a newspaper for advertising
purposes might be less likely to be subject to bias than one conducted
by a litigant in preparation for trial, but motive for bias, or the lack
of it, does not necessarily determine the truthfulness of the individual
returns which make up the survey. The care with which the survey
was carried out, the broad base to be surveyed, and the selection of
subject content are more important considerations. The type and
method of questioning could do much to guarantee at least circum-
stantial trustworthiness to the survey. Indeed, the right kind of
information correctly tabulated could be more reliable than the testi-
mony of witnesses on the stand."
The courts have accepted into evidence tabulations made from
evidence already in the case or available for examination and have
uniformly permitted the introduction of census reports and compila-
tions made from tax records.1 8 There has been a growing recognition
as to the feasibility of using informal methods of presenting economic
facts in antitrust proceedings. In the United States v. Minnesota
Mining and Mfg. Co. case'9 it was said:
The relevant political and economic facts can be presented to the court
in an informal way. It is not necessary to comply with those minimal
standards of evidentiary competence suitable for the proof of other
types of fact even in the comparatively loose procedure commonly fol-
lowed in a civil antitrust case where the government seeks an injunc-
tion.20
1 Deming, On Presentation of the Results of Sample Surveys as Legal Evidence,
49 J. AmER. STAT. Ass'x 814 (1954).
-8 Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HARv. L.
REv. 498 (1953).
17 "Typically, in these cases, the veracity and demeanor of witnesses are not
important. It is difficult to see how any party's interests would be prejudiced by such
procedures where sufficient opportunity for rebuttal exists." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON THE AD NISTRATIVE PRoc anuR AcT, p. 78 (1947). Certainly the tabu-
lated results of pertinent questions would be clearer than those answers of a number
of witnesses obscured by the extraneous matter of voir dire and the usual qualifying
preliminaries.
18 United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Harper v. United States,
143 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1944).
19 92 F.Supp. 947 (D.Mass. 1950).
20 Ibid.
[WINTER
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The same court had observed earlier2 that "so far as this Court is
aware, the Supreme Court has never reversed or criticized a trial
court for admitting hearsay evidence in a civil antitrust case tried
without a jury." "
Thus, it would appear that sizable inroads have been made in the
hearsay rule where the case involves corporate, as contrasted with
individual, violation of the law. Courts as well as administrative
agencies, groaning under the mass of evidence which they must assimi-
late, have been willing to sacrifice some of the protections of the
hearsay rule in the interest of expediting judicial proceedings."
No Opportunity for Cross-Examination. A related objection to that
of hearsay is the contention that the parties are denied due process in
not being able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses testifying
against them when survey evidence is being used. The argument can
be made that cross-examination of the persons conducting the survey
is not enough even if the information which was used was available
to the opposing party. The opportunity for cross-examination of the
persons conducting the survey will arise at the earliest on voir dire
subsequent to the offering, and the next opportunity will be after direct
testimony is concluded at which time the survey has either been
accepted or rejected in evidence. This leaves the purpose of cross-
examination limited only to the weight and not to the admissibility
of the evidence. Should a completely spurious survey be introduced,
the opposing party may always move to have it struck, but the effect
of the evidence already in the trier's mind may not be easily eradicated.
Several decisions are apposite to this question. In United States v.
International Harvester Co. 4 a report of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion based on information furnished by members of the agricultural
implement industry was rejected by the court on the dual grounds of
hearsay and violation of the principle that a witness have first-hand
knowledge and be subject to cross-examination. In Powhatan Mining
Co. v. Ickes" a tabulation based upon invoices filed with the Depart-
' United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349 (D.Mass. 1950).
"To preserve their own jurisdiction the courts must in this type of controversy
relax the rigidity of the hearsay rule." Id. at 355. See also United States v. Minne-
sota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F.Supp. 947 (D.Mass. 1950).
23 "Unless the author of a hearsay statement had personal knowledge or other spe-
cial opportunity to acquire trustworthy information, his statement should not be relied
on for any critical point." United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 349,
355 (D.Afass. 1950). It has been said that this statement is based on the general
proposition that in cases tried without a jury, the objection of hearsay ought to affect
weight rather than admissibility. Comment, 64 HARy. L. Rav. 340 (1950).
-2 274 U.S. 693 (1927).
25 118 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941).
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ment of the Interior was offered into evidence. Here, however, oppo-
ents were denied access to the original invoices because of a statute.
The court ruled that the evidence was not subject to the "ordinary
methods of cross examination," observing that without disclosure of
the sources from which the data was compiled the only errors which
could be checked were those appearing on the face of the record. The
only alternative available was to subpoena all who sent invoices to the
Department. In American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Roundup Coal
Mining Co.26 an attempt was made to show the amounts of money
paid to the company by means of a survey based upon letters to cus-
tomers and their replies. This exhibit was admitted by the trial court
which then directed a verdict for plaintiff. The circuit court reversed
because it could not "escape the conclusion that it was not only hear-
say, but was made up of a series of written self-serving declarations.""2
These cases are solidly backed by the traditional concepts that a party
is entitled to see and examine his accusers. Other cases have recog-
nized the propriety of surveys or summary evidence if the sources are
available for cross-examination, even though they may not actually
be introduced in evidence.2"
The futility of cross-examining all who contributed information was
pointed out in an early case.2" There, some forty to fifty clerks had
worked to prepare tables showing the character of local business and
the reduction therein if certain rates had been in effect. The opponent
was given access to the records and invited to call any clerk he desired.
However, he wished to call all the clerks. In refusing him, the court
said:
To have called each of the clerks would have added very little to the
trustworthiness of the evidence .... No clerk could have testified that
the tables were correct, for the reason that they were not made by him;
neither could any single clerk testify that the figures from which the
tables were compiled were correct, for he only contributed a small frag-
ment to the general result. The method adopted was the only practic-
able one for conducting the investigation. It would have been absolutely
impossible for any one man to have compiled the general result with-
out delaying the case for years. A reasonable safeguard against falsi-
fication in the preparation of such statements is furnished by placing
the records from which they are compiled freely at the disposal of the
adverse party.29
2673 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1934).
27 Id. at 595.
28 See Butler v. United States, 53 F.2d 800 (10th Cir. 1931).
29 Northern Pac. Ry. v. Keyes, 91 Fed. 47, 59 (C.C.D.N. Dak. 1898).
[WINTER
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A perusal of the cases indicates that, as a condition to the admis-
sibility of the survey, the material surveyed shall be either placed in
court or be made available to the other party." It has been suggested
that if the original source of material cannot feasibly be made avail-
able, then an expert summary should be allowed in evidence."' The
trend has been in the direction of admitting surveys, subject to some
check on their accuracy. The following considerations are helpful in
understanding the attitudes of the courts toward survey evidence:
Courts are more likely to admit sample evidence as to objective facts
than for group or public opinion; they are more inclined to admit it
if they see no alternative method of proof and the results tend to
coincide with their subjective analysis of the true state of affairs; there
is a tendency to disguise true motivations and discuss technical ques-
tions of hearsay and materiality, and, courts are prone to admit sur-
vey evidence only on a showing of precedent for such use." The cases
seem to support these observations.
The public opinion cases. Some of the first cases dealing with the
admissibility of survey evidence are those in the field of trademark
infringement and false and deceptive advertising. These concern a
slightly different situtation, since the statements of the witnesses
tabulated in polls showing their interpretations of advertisements or
tradenames are not offered to establish the truth or falsity of the
material contained in the advertisements, but only to show the par-
ticular subjective impressions which were made on them. One of the
first arose from an action to enjoin the use of the name "Elgin" in
connection with timepieces." Plaintiff wished to show that respond-
"' See 3 NVIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1230 (3d ed. 1940) ; American Bar Ass'n, Report of
the Comnmittee on Practice and Procedure in the Trial of Antitrust Cases 43 (1954).
31 Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L. J.
1242, 1259 (1949).
82 Admissibility in Courts of Law of Economic Data Based on Samples, 28 J.Bus.
114 (1955).
33 Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376 (D.Del. 1928). The case
seems to turn on the meaning to be given to Equity Rule 48 which was up for first
impression in the court. No precedents were cited either here or in the Roundup Coal
case, 73 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1934), and neither case has been cited to date.
34 150 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1945). One of the landmark cases on this subject was
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 Fed. 515 (2d Cir. 1913). At issue
was the right to use the name "XVebster's" on a dictionary and the admissibility of the
preface of an earlier dictionary by one Ogilvie. Judge Hand applied the Wigmore
rationale, finding the necessity satisfied by the fact that Ogilvie had been dead some
45 years and trustworthiness by finding no motive for fabrication. He would have
refused to admit a statement disconnected with the book's substance, such as Ogilvie's
statement of the date of his marriage, but he felt that it was absurd to admit learned
opinions and refuse to admit statements as to their derivation. Judge Hand's opinion
pierces the fog of legal formalism to recognize that the law must come to accept types
of evidence which would not have been admitted many years previously. As the reli-
19581
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ent's use of plaintiff's established trade name was in fact trading on
the reputation which it had built up over the years. This was to be
done by the introduction of a signed statement by one Lynn, a member
of an advertising firm, which purported to give the results of a survey
by questionnaire especially prepared for purposes of trial, which was
sent to some 2,000 "representative retail jewelers," asking them
whether the word, "Elgin," meant the product of plaintiff to them. The
court, although recognizing the difficulty of proving a tradename,
refused to admit the affidavit. The judge felt that an expert is not
allowed to base his judgment upon the opinion of another expert, but
must base it upon legal evidence. Not finding that situation present,
he refused the exhibit. However, in Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC"4 several
lay witnesses were asked over objection to give their opinion of the
meaning of certain advertisements. The admissibility of their an-
swers was upheld on appeal. A similar case was Quaker Oats Co. v.
General Mills," where the issue was whether the use of the suffix,
"ies," preceded by the generic name of a grain created a false impres-
sion as to the manufacturer. Both parties conducted surveys. Defend-
ant also subpoenaed seventeen of the persons it had interviewed to
testify at the trial. The survey consisted of a personal interview and
the filling out of a questionnaire, which asked questions as to the
origin of "Oaties." Each witness thought that the maker of "Wheaties"
made "Oaties." This testimony and the survey were allowed in evi-
dence. The circuit court affirmed without specifically passing on this
issue. In United States v. 88 Cases Containing Bireley's6 the issue
was met head on. The Government introduced surveys made up of
the answers to 3,539 questionnaires seeking the writer's opinion of
what Bireley's contained. The court said, "For the statements of the
persons interviewed were not offered for the truthfulness of their asser-
tions as to the composition of the beverage. . . . They were offered
solely to show as a fact the reaction of ordinary householders and
others of the public generally when shown a bottle of Bireley's Orange
Beverage." The court then went on to show that the adequacy of the
surveys was a matter of weight only.
The Bireley's opinion points up the different considerations involved
ability of such evidence becomes more assured, it is unwise to exclude it on purely
technical grounds. As he pointed out, "Ogilvie may of course have been a malingerer;
he may have been employed by unscrupulous publishers to assert a derivation which
was untrue; but such considerations would operate to exclude nearly all testimony
ever given in a court of law." 207 Fed. at 518.
85 134 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1943).
86187 F.2d 967, 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
[WINTM
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when this type of survey is offered. However, the underlying prin-
ciples are the same and the willingness of the courts to take a new
look at the hearsay and lack of cross-examination objections is demon-
strated.
RULES GOVERNING ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE BEFORE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Since administrative agencies are governed by different rules of
procedure and evidence than federal courts, consideration of their
problems must be made separately. The Administrative Procedure
Act27 is purposefully vague on the admissibility of evidence. Recog-
nizing the need for freedom in adjudication and for a further check
upon dependence on unreliable evidence inherent in a tribunal skilled
in its field, the Congress, in enacting the APA, wished to make the
reception of evidence as broad as possible. It has long been recognized
that administrative agencies are not bound by strict rules of evidence."
The legislative history of the APA indicates the awareness of Congress
that, as a matter of convenience, technical data may be reduced to
writing and introduced as other evidence in the courts. 9 The value
to be given to this evidence will vary with the nature of the proceeding
and the relative unavailability of other and better evidence."0
However, a problem of possible bias arises when the prosecuting
agency seeks to use information which it has gathered itself. 1 An early
case42 refused to allow the agency to use information gathered pur-
suant to its statutory requirement as a basis for a finding where the
opposing party would not be entitled to a hearing. "In such cases the
Commissioners [ICC] cannot act upon their own information as could
37 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c) (1952). The pertinent section reads,
"[E]very party shall have the right to present his case or defense by oral or docu-
mentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence and to conduct such cross-examination
as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts." Because of the absence
of a jury and the technical nature of the subject matter involved, it was felt that the
common law rules of evidence would be needlessly strict. Legislative History of the
Administrative Procedure Act p. 208 (1946) ; Report of the Attorney General's Com-
inittee to Study Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies p. 70 (1941). The
latter group found no widespread abuses of the basic principles of evidence. Id. at 70-71.
*t See ICC v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25 (1904).
:39 The Attorney General thought that "This (section) is not intended to disturb the
existing practice of submitting technical written reports, summaries, and analyses of
material gathered in field surveys, and other devices appropriately adapted to the par-
ticular issues involved in specialized proceedings. Whether the agency must in such
cases produce the maker of the report depends ... on what is reasonable in all the cir-
cumstances." Attorney General's Manual on the APA p. 133 (1947).
do Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949). See also John Bene & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 299 Fed. 468 (2d Cir. 1924).
41 See the Powhatan case, note 25, supra.
42 ICC v. Louisville & Nash. R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88 (1913).
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jurors in primitive days."" The flexibility of administrative proceed-
ings has had its effect on the courts. One judge recognized the need
for greater latitude not only to aid in his own proceedings, but also
to achieve consistency in the application of the antitrust laws by dis-
trict courts and the Federal Trade Commission." The difficulty has
been how to reconcile these laudable aims with the traditional views
of judicial procedure.
Recent administrative decisions. Two recent decisions of the Federal
Trade Commission bear upon the question of the admissibility of
survey evidence. These represent rather broad steps beyond the pre-
viously defined limitations put upon the receipt of this type of evidence.
However, these decisions are indicative of the trend of authority in
this field.
In the Pillsbury case," in attempting to prove the market share of
the respondent before and after the acquisition of two of its competi-
tors, counsel in support of the complaint introduced several surveys
conducted by newspapers and magazines showing the brands of flour
and mixes on store shelves (Scripps-Howard), the brands preferred
by housewives (Good Housekeeping), and the sales of mixes in the
New York City area (New York World-Telegram). The hearing
examiner had excluded this material on grounds of materiality (rather
than admissibility). Thus, the question of the admissibility of the
evidence was not squarely at issue. The FTC in overruling the exami-
ner stated, "Market information . . . is of value in determining the
issues in this proceeding. Such surveys if properly conducted, while
certainly not conclusive, are indicators of market trends and the exist-
ence of competitive products in the market surveyed. Such indicators,
along with other information, may be of value in assisting the Com-
mission in determining the actual market condition."
Two years later in Crown-Zellerbac4* the FTC was confronted
43Id. at 93.
44 See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., note 21, .s1pra.
45In the matter of Pillsbury Mills, Inc., Dkt. No. 6000 (FTC 1953).
46 In the matter of Crown Zellerbach Corp., 51 F.T.C. 1105, 1111 (1955). A survey
similar to the one described here was prepared for use in the Pillsbury case, supra.
Questionnaires were sent to all mills shipping more than 400 cwts. of family flour
into the southeastern states. A similar questionnaire was sent to cake mix manufac-
turers. The purpose was to determine the amounts and brands of flour and mixes sold
in the southeast and their origins. This survey is one of many in the early stages of
preparation, which will be used in future FTC proceedings. It will be interesting to
see whether it will be accepted by the same hearing examiner who rejected the surveys
mentioned in the body of this article. It demonstrates the increasing reliance put upon
this type of evidence to supply economic facts upon which some generalization of
market condition can be made.
[WINTERa
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head on with the issue of the admissibility of a survey. Since the facts
there were peculiar and the case represents a rather liberal view, it
will be presented in some detail. Respondent, a Western concern, was
the second largest paper manufacturer in the United States and the
largest in the West. Its production of certain coarse paper products
represented about fifty-one per cent of the market in the eleven Western
states. Its acquisition of the third largest manufacturer of coarse
paper in the West was the basis of the FTC action. A survey was
devised which was designed to show the source of supply of coarse
paper products in the Western states. A questionnaire asking the
sources of supply of various types of coarse paper was mailed to some
500 jobbers and converters in the area. Various charts and graphs
were made up showing the tabulations of the approximate 490 returns.
It was felt at first that the rules of the Commission required that the
names of the firms reporting be kept secret. The Commission finally
ruled that the returns could be examined by respondent and used in
cross-examining the economists who conducted the survey. However,
counsel supporting the complaint did not call as witnesses the parties
who filled out the questionnaires, and the examiner sustained objec-
tions to questions put to witnesses called for other purposes as to the
returns that they had submitted. The returns were not required to be
certified.," Thus, the several grounds for objection were present:
hearsay testimony, unsworn, not subject to cross-examination, and
bias-prepared post litem motem for the purpose of trial by the prose-
cuting agency. The Commission was faced with a dilemma. It realized
that, if this source of information were unavailable, the only alterna-
tive was to call the 490 firms reporting to the survey. But the trial
would then become so long and unwieldly that administration of the
law would suffer. Further, under cross-examination, much valuable
trade information might be divulged to the detriment of the witnesses.
The Commission summed up the arguments of the respondent that
the survey was conducted by mail, that it was made for the purpose
of trial, that the person in charge was not expert in the industry being
surveyed, that the method of selecting firms or persons to be ques-
tioned was biased, and that there was no opportunity for cross-examina-
tion of the persons supplying the information as going to the weight
of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.4" The Commission
47 There is a provision for criminal penalties for giving false information to the
FTC. 15 U.S.C. § 50 (1952).
43 However, evidence brought out during voir dire examination showed inaccuracies
in the makeup of the survey. In making his initial decision the hearing examiner
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noted that "One of the developments of our complex economic life is
the increase in the use of information of this character, both by gov-
ernment and business." The conclusion was that the survey was not
subject to exclusion on grounds of hearsay.
PREPARING AND ANALYZING A SURVEY: POINTS IN SUPPORT AND
OPPOSITION
Aside from the use of survey evidence in cases where the state of
mind or belief of the public is at issue, such as in trademark infringe-
ment or false and misleading advertising cases, there are other situa-
tions in antitrust suits where it can be useful. The most important
factor in an antitrust action is the effect of the act in question upon a
given "market." Surveys can be used to show this effect on various
markets. This can be done by showing sources of supply to a selection
of wholesalers and manufacturers within a limited geographical area. 9
It can also be shown in terms of sources of supply to the ultimate
consumer. The latter approach would be more useful in evaluating
the factors of desirability and demand of a given product line.
There are various methods which may be used to insure a repre-
sentative cross-section."0 In the first situation mentioned above where
the total number of potential interviewees is limited, something closer
to complete coverage can be attained. Whether this is desirable or
not will probably depend almost entirely upon the attitude of the
court, since statisticians do not think that accuracy necessarily in-
creases in proportion to the percentage of coverage."
admitted the survey in a revised form, but specifically refused to make finding of fact
based upon it. The decision was affirmed by the full commission upon respondent's
appeal. At the time of the writing of this article (winter, 1957) the case has been
appealed but no decision has been handed down.
49 In the matter of Crown Zellerbach, note 46, supra.
50 The over-all accuracy of a statistical survey may be set in advance with reference
to the use that is to be made of it. Where the purpose is to test whether a specific line
of conduct violates the precepts of a certain law, a great amount of precision is needed.
Thus where price discrimination is sought to be shown, the significance of the cost
differences in relation to the price differences must be precisely established. But,
where the ultimate question is one of market structure or competitive behavior, the
difference of a few percentage points would not seriously affect the usefulness of the
survey. Of course, before anything can be done, a definition and delimitation must be
given to the "market" in question. Often disagreement with this basic concept has
doomed an otherwise useful survey.
51 "A complete coverage, no matter how carried out, and even though it is incom-
plete ... has weight in evidence. A sample, unless it is a 10 percent sample, has two
strikes against it to start with. People who are not statisticians assume that the sheer
size of a complete coverage will somehow cover up its incompleteness and the flaws in
the method of measurement or in the interviewing. . . . A 10 per cent sample has
almost equal standing with a complete count-maybe even better than a 15 per cent
sample. Why, what 10 per cent, is hardly ever questioned, even by experts in quantita-
tive subject-matter." Deming, On the Presentation of the Results of Sample Surveys
as Legal Evidence, 49 J. Amer. Stat. Ass'n 814, 818-19 (1954).
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Other aspects of market control, such as methods of competition,
price and cost variance, and price and cost control, can be compiled
by means of proper questions. Once the cross-section to be surveyed
is determined, the scope of questions depends upon the need of the
surveyor for information. Where extensive market information is
needed, such as in cases involving Sherman Act violations, much of
this data can be obtained by surveys. The "rule of reason" test of
guilt demands proof of actual harm to the public interest which might
be shown by a plethora of witnesses. This sort of information could
in large part be gathered in survey form.
A question arises as to whether the survey should be conducted by
personal interview, by written questionnaire, or both. One recom-
mendation for the former method is that the interviewee is less likely
to misunderstand a question when the questioner is available for
explanation and clarification. Further, the danger of an interviewee
failing to answer a question where detailed information is required is
obviated. The government agencies have a double advantage in this
respect, in that people are more likely to cooperate in answering their
questions without knowing exactly why, and because they can compel
information without actually filing a suit." The private litigant is not
so fortunate. Businessmen are much less likely to allow a private firm
to ask them questions which involve trade-secrets and business
information even with a guaranty of non-disclosure." However, the
average housewife is usually not averse to disclosing which product
she prefers, and the average businessman does not mind naming his
sources of supply or even giving estimates of amounts spent with them.
Much of the problem resolves into a question of public relations,
which has no bearing on the legality of surveys. It may be questioned
whether answering a few questions either orally or in writing is more
onerous or time-consuming than being subpoenaed as a witness.
The greatest obstacle to the successful use of surveys lies in their
preparation. The scope of the questions is a vital problem. The survey
must be planned in advance to assure the right questions being asked.
2 I.e., grand jury subpoena, reports under § 6 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46
(1952), and the subpoena power of § 5 of the latter.
53 There is no way to estimate the advantage which a defendant may gain simply
by being brought to trial in respect to the information which its competitors must
divulge. They figuratively must lay bare their economic souls in order to convict their
industry partner. In no other manner could this information be made available to the
public or the industry as a whole. It is said that one defendant will more than recoup
the expense of defense and the loss of property simply by virtue of the facts that it
learned about the competitive structure of the market during the suit. This seems to
be a problem beyond solution under our way of jurisprudence.
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This demands the assistance of someone familiar with the market to
be surveyed. It would be disastrous to request information about a
product that did not exist or to use diametrically opposed terms in
describing it. The very form of the questions should be similar to
that used in the trade, so that the person questioned can answer in
terms of his own knowledge of the industry without making allow-
ances for misunderstandings or local connotations. For example, it
might be confusing to ask a lawyer to list all damage cases in which
he has participated, because he is trained to think in terms of contract
and tort cases. While the lawyer could answer the question, he would
have to use two different classifications to arrive at the answer. This
sort of error must be avoided. One might think that the members of
an industry would simply disregard a question containing an obvious
error, but past experience has shown that some will attempt to answer
the question. This usually means that the answer to some correctly
phrased question will not be usable because the surveyor cannot tell
where the answers to the incorrect question should go. It would be
erroneous to combine the obviously wrong answers with some other
answers, even though the surveyor knows where they should go. This
would involve tampering with the survey, as well as introducing unveri-
fied data into it.
The questions must be carefully phrased so as to require simple
answers. They must be unequivocal in nature so that even a hasty
reading will show exactly what data is requested. The questions must
be simple and direct, and the categories must be broad enough within
established product lines. If a printed form is used, the places for
marks or answers must be clearly labeled. The reasons for visual
clarity are obvious. Nothing could be more harmful than to have
scores of forms which cannot be used because the figures were put in
the wrong column. Whether to require certification by the person
answering the survey questionnaire presents this dilemma: Although
a person who is required to certify that his answers are correct is more
likely to take pains to make them so, he is less likely to answer where
he does not have exact information, and may thus deprive the survey
of a nearly correct, educated guess. Certification usually makes the
survey appear in a better light to the court and will tend to silence
some of the opponent's arguments in advance. Whether or not to
require certification will depend upon the exigencies of the particular
situation and the time available for surveying.
Checklist for the opposition. At the outset it will be assumed that
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survey evidence is hearsay but that there is a need for it in antitrust
cases for the sake of efficient judicial processes." What can counsel
opposing the introduction of the survey do to prevent an inaccurate
and biased survey from being accepted into evidence? How can the
safeguards of trustworthiness be retained and the accuracy of the
survey be guaranteed? These questions admit of no easy answer. The
first opportunity to probe the surveyor is on voir dire examination
prior to the ruling accepting or rejecting the survey. This opportunity
should be exploited to the utmost, for here the limitations of the
formulation, inaccuracies in format and errors in tabulation can be
brought to the attention of the court. While the scope of examination
is limited, the goal is not, since here, and only here, is the admissibility
of the survey at issue. Once the exception to the hearsay rule is made
and the survey admitted into evidence, all other matters go to weight
only. It would be useful to have a statistician available to aid counsel
in probing the methods used in making up the survey. If there have
been mechanical or logical errors, this is the best time to uncover them.
The statistician could testify as an expert as to the propriety and cor-
rectness of the methods used in compiling the survey. Since there is
apparently agreement among statisticians as to the correct methods
for preparing surveys, his testimony might go far toward establishing
the existence or lack of bias or poor technique.
The next opportunity to test the validity of the conclusions of the
survey is by cross-examination. Information gained through use of
this "engine for truth" offers the next best security against an improper
survey. Since the conclusions of the survey depend upon the concep-
tions of the economist or expert who prepared the questions, any
weakness therein should be developed for use both against the survey
itself and in argument. The problem of whom to cross-examine is
paramount. Obviously, to require that all persons whose statements
were recorded to make up the survey should be available for cross-
examination would nullify the usefulness of the survey and make its
only utility as a guide to the offeror's witnesses. There are situations
154 "We have to find some way to try these cases under this merger statute so both
the respondent's rights are protected and the public interests' (sic) are protected. One
of our great problems is how we are going to prove the probability of injurdy (sic)
to competition and a greater market, regional market and the national market, and if
counsel in support of the complaint has to bring in 500 corporations we will just have
to report to Congress that the law enforcement agencies have broken down and we
cannot do anything about mergers or Section 7." Statement of former Chairman
Howry, Transcript of oral argument on appeal of the examiner's ruling excluding
survey evidence, In the Matter of Crown Zellerbach Corp., Dkt. No. 6180, at 24
(April 26, 1955).
195s]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
where persons would be unwilling to give information if they knew
it was to be used in an adversary proceeding. Furthermore, if the
declarant were connected to the information, he might suffer harm of
retribution or disclosure of trade secrets to the corporation on trial.";
It has been suggested that a cross-section or sample of persons
interviewed be called. 6 This would not be an effective means of
guaranteeing the accuracy of the survey, since an unscrupulous sur-
vey-taker could always select the favorable witnesses to be called.
The best method of testing the survey would be by examining the
methods by which it was compiled. "Obviously the value of a survey
depends upon the manner in which it was conducted-whether the
techniques used were slanted or fair." 7 The great danger at present
lies in the use of unsound techniques rather than in the possibility of
slanting or bias. One court has required that the planners, super-
visors and some of the workers be called so that the court could see
and hear them; that they be prepared to give a complete exposition
of the poll and its results; and, that the work sheets, reports, surveys
and all documents used or prepared should be offered in evidence."
These requirements would go far toward providing checks for accuracy,
but they should not be considered all-inclusive. The distinction be-
tween the person who conducts the survey and testifies as to his
methods and the person who apears as an expert and draws infer-
ences from the survey should be kept clear. It is dangerous to com-
bine the two. 9 It is risky for the statistician to yield to the temptation
of testifying as to his conclusions based only on the insecure ground
of knowledge accumulated during the progress of the survey. 0 Such
action could create prejudice against the survey. Further, the bene-
fits of cross-examination would be lessened since the statistician,
unlike the expert, could always hide behind his lack of knowledge
should the questions become too embarrassing.
Some of the arguments against the use of surveys might be elimi-
55 See note 53, supra.
56Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HeAv. L.
R1v. 498 (1953).
M Rhodes Pharmacal Co., Inc. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1954), reverscd
on other grounds, 348 U.S. 940 (1955).
58 People v. Franidin Natl. Bank, 200 Misc. 557, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 81, reversed, 281
App. Div. 757, 118 N.Y.S.2d 210, affirmed, 305 N.Y. 453, 113 N.E.2d 796, reversed,
347 U.S. 373 (1954). The opinions subsequent to the trial court did not deal with the
evidence question.
59 See Deming, On the Presentation of the Results of Sample Surveys as Legal
Evidence, note 51, supra.
60 Ibid. See also, Deming, On the Contributions of Standards of Sampling to Legal
Evidence and Accounting, Current Business Studies No. 19 (1954).
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nated by informal agreement or by stipulation before trial. If the
opposing parties could agree on the methods to be used in conducting
the survey, much of the subsequent jockeying could be done away
with. Remembering that the survey itself will show nothing in favor
of either party except with respect to the inferences which will be
drawn therefrom, such informal agreements would not ncessarily
amount to great concessions. The raw data in the survey is neutral.
If some means can be found whereby both parties agree that the in-
formation was accurately collected and tabulated, then the task of
the trier of fact would be immeasurably lightened. Whether he wishes
to give great weight to the inferences or interpretations to be drawn
from the survey becomes a matter for argument by counsel. But it
serves the interests of both the enforcement agency and the respondent
to have an accurate survey made. Any steps that can insure this
result should be taken.
CONCLUSIONS
The confidence of statisticians in their methods and the availability
of means of computing the margin of error are strong arguments for
the admission of a properly conducted survey in antitrust proceed-
ings. The reluctance of the bar to utilize surveys and recognize their
utility has prevented more expeditious trials and perhaps, the filing
of some cases. While any survey is rightfully subject to the criticism
that it is not completely accurate, this argument may be advanced
against all testimony. It appears that the bounds of inaccuracy are
well within safe limits if the survey is prepared by a competent, well-
informed person. These facts, in conjunction with the great need pre-
viously spoken of, indicate that the rules of evidence should be broad-
ened to admit surveys in antitrust proceedings.
It is repugnant to the traditions of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence to
base a judgment on ex parte proceedings; the rights of confrontation
are too basic in our minds. Where human liberty is at stake, no with-
drawal from evidentiary safeguards can be tolerated. But where a
corporation is accused of actions in contravention of a nation's eco-
nomic preconceptions, the same considerations do not apply. There
must be concessions made to the times. If the purposes of the anti-
trust laws are to be attained, then some flexibility in enforcement must
be allowed. The careful use of well-conducted surveys offers great
promise of success in this reaard.
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